A double ambiguity has been charged against Rawls’s difference principle (DP). Is it Maximin, Leximin, or something else? Usually, following A. Sen, scholars identify DP with the so-called Leximin. One argues here that one has to distinguish 1° the Leximin, 2° the Maximin (as rule of justice formally analogous to the maximin rule of decision), represented by the figure in L of the perfectly substitutable goods, and 3° the genuine DP. When the augmentation of inequality benefits the worse off, only Pareto-strong improvements are permitted. Leximin would also permit Pareto-weak improvements too (after the first maximum D), where only the richest improves: from (2, 3) to (2, 5), say. This is forbidden by DP. With two classes, unlike Maximin, DP has no curve of indifference and is always decisive, as Leximin is. For undecisive Rules of Justice, which admit indifferent curves, I propose to add a lexically secondary rule, to break ties. That move is able to clarify the links and the differences between on the one hand Maximin alone, with its typical indifference curves in L, and on the other hand, the DP properly understood and the Leximin, which both have no indifferent curves. With two classes of persons (best off/worse off), DP appears more egalitarian than Leximin, because it's secondary rule is MinIn (Minimization of Inequality). But the intuition behind the distinction is that it cannot possible “fair” that only the best off improves in a productive social cooperation.

This paper provides steady state queue-size distribution for a G/G/1 queue by using principle of maximum entropy. For this purpose we have used average queue length and normalizing condition as constraints to drive queue-size distribution. Our results give good approximation as demonstrated by taking a numerical illustration. In particular case when square coefficient of variation of inter-arrival time is equal to one, the average queue length provided tallies with the results for M/G/1 model. Other particulars cases have also been deduced which match with already existing results. این مقاله توزیع طول صف را در حالت پایدار برای مدل صف G/G/1 با استفاده از اصول ماکزیمم انتروپی پیدا میکند. برای انجام این منظور از میانگین طول صف و شرط نرمالیزه کردن به عنوان محدودیت استفاده میشود. مقاله به کمک مثالهای عددی نتایج خوبی را عاید میسازد. در حالت خاص، برای مواردی که مربع ضریب تغییرات زمان مابین دو ورود برابر یک است میانگین طول صف با نتایج مدل صف M/G/1 توافق دارد. حالات خاص دیگری که در حال حاضر وجود دارند نیز استخراج شده و با نتایج این مقاله مطابقت دارد.

The precautionary principle has been widely discussed in academic, legal and political areas. Debates stem due to various definitions and wordings of the principle and the fact that it has been reflected in both binding and nonbinding international instruments in various fields. The role of the European Union and its members is undisputed in the evolution of the principle. It can be found in different contexts; from its statements in international disputes to Jurisprudence of its judicial organs. This paper, with an analytical-descriptive approach, examines the situation of the precautionary principle in Domestic legal systems of European countries, primary and secondary rules of the EU and the jurisprudence of general courts, ECJ and ECHR to prove or deny the customary nature of the principle in this region.

One of the requirements and guarantees of the principle of neutrality is to conduct preliminary investigations by an independent judge and to distinguish the prosecutor from the investigating authority.In this regard,the investigator entered the structure of the department of justice and the prosecutor's powers were prosecuted as a party to the limited criminal proceedings.Although the principle of impartiality and the necessity of observance of it in Article 3 of the Criminal Procedure Code of our country have been emphasized,but its requirements and aspects Particularly in the preliminary stage of the preliminary investigation, officials have been neglected.In the same way, prosecutors still have the power to investigate and arrest the defendants in a large number of crimes and the investigator does not have complete independence in conducting investigations.Moreover,despite the adoption of the judiciary system,in some crimes and in the courts of the section,the system of public courts (all stages of proceedings by the judge of the unit( are applied,which is contrary to the principle of neutrality.In this article, the principle of neutrality and its components in the preliminary investigation and the degree of adherence of the legislator of our country to the requirements of this principle have been analyzed.

The proposition “ Any essentially possible being requires a cause” must be considered as the precise wording of the causality principle. This is because according to principality of quiddity, the essential possibility is the criterion for quiddity’ s need of a cause, and according to the principality of existence, it is the sign for the of need of its existence to a cause. As for the attributes of the things, this principle is stated as “ the accidental is caused” . This is in contrast to “ the essential is not caused” which refers to the fact that the thing’ s essential attributes do not require a cause. The causality principle is itself a certain statement of the special mode of the principle of “ impossibility of preponderance without a preponderant” and is reduced to it. Thus, as far as self-evidence and non-self-evidence as well as provability and non-provability are concerned, it follows that principle; and as that principle is non-provable evident, so is the causality principle. From the principle of “ impossibility of preponderance without a preponderant” , another principle is derived as follows: the principle of “ impossibility of giving preponderance without a preponderant” which is the statement of the principle “ impossibility of preponderance without a preponderant” for the free-willed agent and his volitional actions, and is non-provable evident just like it.

Constrain is the condition of driven by necessity. The principle of constraint determines the duties of the person constrained. In jurisprudence, it includes a range of activities from cleanness to blood compensation. However, jurisprudents have discussed it mainly with regard to those that can be eaten and drunk, and presented three different interpretations: fear of losing one"s life; fear in general, including fear of losing one"s life, or one"s limb, etc.; and fear of things not related to oneself but to others. The roots of constraint are compulsion, precautionary concealment, loss and necessity. The present article deals with a kind of constraint whose source is necessiy. The Qur"an has explicitly excused the person constrained from duties provided that the oppressor shows no inclination to sin. Tradition says that "there is so unlawful act that God Almighty has not made it permissible under constraint." The intellect also knows it permissible to give up necessary duties and to do the unlawful acts under constraint. Finally, the writer presents the conditions under which the application of the principle of constrain is made permissible.

By definition, ikrāh (duress) means forcing someone to do something unwillingly. Ikrah would be realized under seven conditions. In ikrāh over the prohibited, the criterion is inability of mukrah (i.e., the person under duress) to be released from threat and repelling loss and the culprit"s mere claim would be accepted. In transactions, however, ikrāh would be true only through discontent. The criterion for nullifying the conventional decree is non-observance, and mere claiming of ikrāh is not acceptable. Ikrāh is of two kinds: lawful and unlawful. The former is permissible and the latter is forbidden. The obligatory precept for the mukruh asserts that committing the forbidden and abandoning the obligatory is permissible for him/her except in case of homicide. And the conventional decree is that the mukruh is acquitted from qişāş (retaliation), hadd (legal penalty), dimān (liability), etc. The sources of rule of duress include āyah 106 of sūrat al-Nahl, the āyahs adduced by the principle of constraint, as well as tradition, consensus. and intellect.

One of the most important principles of old logic and Aristotle's philosophy is the principle of presupposition, based on which "the affirmation of an attribute for a subject is posterior to the affirmation of that subject." From among the important consequences of this principle, we can refer to the following two propositions:1. An affirmative proposition without a subject is false.2. A negative proposition without a subject is true.The following two propositions are in opposition to the principle of conversion by contradiction because of the following example: A. The general negative proposition of "no non-existent is non-existent" is true because of the lack of subject (according to proposition 2).B. The conversion by contradiction of this proposition, i.e. "some non-existents are not non-existent", is false (This is because it is the same as the particular negative proposition of "some existents are not in existence". The opposite of this proposition i.e." every existent is in existence, is true.This indicates that the principle of the conversion by contradiction does not preserve the truth of the proposition, whereas the "preservation of truth" has been mentioned in the definition or the principle of conversion by contradiction. This example of this principle is in contrast to the second consequence of the principle of presupposition (proposition 2). In this paper, some other examples of the principle of conversion by contradiction will be presented which are inconsistent with the second consequence of the principle of presupposition proposition. Since the principle of conversion by contradiction has two definitions (given by early and contemporary philosophers), the inconsistency of the principle of presupposition with this principle will be explained based on both definitions and with the help of some related examples. Some solutions will also be provided in order to remove this inconsistency, and it will be shown that none of them will be helpful in accomplishing this task. Finally, the standpoint of modern logic in this regard will be evaluated.

It took humankind a long time to realize its inability to understand different aspects of environmental risks and find that it would bear irreversible damage if such a risk occurs.Knowing the vulnerability of the environment and the limitations of science to accurately predict threats to it, led to emerging the precautionary principle. This concept has stemmed from domestic legal systems and is being developed in international law. Various Formulations of the principle and its including in binding and nonbinding international instruments in varied fields have resulted in controversial discussions between states, Tribunals and Commentators on Its legal status in International law. They are at least divided into two groups: some who are on customary status of the principle and some who entitle it as a general principle of law.This paper examines different views towards the legal status of the precautionary principle in International law and try to give a reasonable opinion at the end.